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IUTURE OF CASH 
This is an action for breach of a written contract for social 
services. 
STATEMKNT OF FACTS: 
On December 23, 1982, the parties entered into a contract for 
personal services whereby Plaintiff /Appellant was to provide social services 
in 1983 for certain troubled youth as part of the services requested by a 
contract which the Defendant/Respondent had with the State of Utah. The 
contract provided that Plaintiff/Appellant would be paid a total of Twenty-
four Thousand Dollars ($24,000) as he performed services at the rate of Fifty 
Dollars ($50) per hour, but not to exceed Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) in 
any one ( 1) month, but if not paid that much in any month the difference was 
to accumulate so he would be paid a total of Eighteen Thousand Dollars 
($18,000) by June 30, 1983, if he was ready, willing and able to provide the 
requested services in that amount in the first half of 1983 and Six Thousand 
Dollars ($6,000) by December 31, 1983, subject to the same availability 
requirement. Difficulties insued as a result of the Defendant/Respondent not 
requesting any services of the Plaintiff/Appellant prior to the termination of 
the contract by Defendant/Respondent letter of February 10, 1983, except for 
two (2) assignments (Findings of Fact Nos. 2 and 3) which involved a total of 
five (5) hours of services (see Findings of Fact No. 5). In connection with 
an advance of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1, 500) made by Defendant/ 
Respondent to Plaintiff/Appellant on January 10, 1983, when the first 
assignment was made, the Plaintiff /Appellant made an unauthorized phone call 
to a state official requesting that the State advance certain monies to the 
Defendant/Respondent (Findings of Fact No. 3). On January 25, 1983, (date not 
specified in Findings of fact, but no dispute in evidence as to when it 
occurred) Plaintiff/Appellant met with one Steve Trotter, a youth for which 
the Defendant/Respondent had responsibility without first contacting said 
youth's home parent or assigned social worker (Findings of Fact No. 6). On 
January 31, 1983, Defendant/Respondent requested Plaintiff /Appellant to move 
into an interior office in the buildings where both parties had their offices 
at 9136 South State Street and Plaintiff/Appellant refused to do so (he 
contended his contract did not require it and it would be too expensive to 
move all his furniture). (See Findings of Fact No. 4.) Without making any 
express conclusion of law that the above acts of Defendant breached the 
contract in question or that the breaches were material so as to warrant 
termination of the contract the Court concluded that "Defendant justifiably 
terminated 'for cause' the December 1982 contract with Plaintiff." 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
After a bench trial on the merits, the lower Court concluded that 
Defendants terminated the subject contract for cause and denied any relief to 
Plaintiff for breach of contract or for anticipatory breach of contract. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 011 APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant seeks to have this Court reverse the lower 
Court's conclusion that the subject contract was terminated for cause and to 
remand the case to the lower Court to ascertain the amount of judgment that 
should be entered in favor of Plaintiff /Appellant and against Defendant/ 
Respondent since Defendant/Respondent has failed, negleted, and refused to pay 
the Twenty-two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($22,500) balance due on the 
contract for services to be performed prior to January 1, 1984, less the 
appropriate offset due to mitigation or costs saved from not fulfilling the 
services Plaintiff /Appellant was obligated to perform if asked to do so. 
POIRT I 
THE PARTIAL BREACHES OF COllTRACT, IF ARY, SET FORTH Ill THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FillDillGS OF FACT WERK ROT SO MATERIAL AS TO WARRAllT THE LOWER COURT Ill 
TKRMIBATillG THE COITRACT Ill QUESTION 
Section 241 of the second Restatement of Contract sets forth the 
applicable principle in such cases. It reads as follows: 
Section 241 Circumstances Significant in Determining 
Whether a Failure is Material 
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer 
performance is material, the following circumstances are 
significant: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be 
deprived of the benefit which he reasonably expected; 
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{b) the extent to which the injured party can be 
adequately compensated for the part of that benefit of 
which he will be deprived; 
{c) the extent to which the party failing to 
perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; 
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to 
perform or to offer to perform will cure his failure, 
taking account of all the circumstances including any 
reasonable assurances; 
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party 
failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with 
standards of good faith and fair dealing. 
In the case of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association vs. 
Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 325 P2d 899 ( 1958) this Court cited the first 
Restatment of Contracts, Section 274 and 313 with favor. In that case the 
opinion on this point reads as follows: 
Furthermore, it is a recognized principle of 
contract law that a breach of an insubstantial nature, 
which is severable and does not vi tally change the 
transaction, does not release the other party completely 
from performing his obligations under the contract, but 
gives rise to a right for damages for any loss occasioned 
thereby. This $2,000 was allowed as an offset in favor 
of Cassady and Hartford and that is all they are entitled 
to. (Footnote omitted). 
In the instant case none of the breaches of contract, if in fact 
they were breaches of contract, were substantial, all were minor and certainly 
did not vitally change the transaction which was a contract to render social 
services. These conclusions find support in the following facts taking each 
arguable breach in the order of the Court's findings. 
Phone calls of January 10, 1983 to Russ Van Vleet (R58, Findings of 
Fact No. 3). Although the Court cited the protion of the contract which 
prohibited Plaintiff/Appellant from any conduct which would "tend to 
complicate or otherwise negatively effect services relationship with said 
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department" thus implying that this call violated that provision, the Court 
dld not make any express finding to that effect and the testimony of the 
Defendant/Respondent's director, Kent Burke, was to the contrary. When he was 
asked, "Did Mr. Van Vleet say anything to you that would indicate that that 
was creating an adversary relationship between you and the State of Utah," he 
responded, "he thought it was very strange that Layne would be calling about 
that, yes." (T.4) Furthermore, Mr. Burke admitted testifying in his 
deposition that, "I didn't remember the telephone call." (T.5) 
Reguest of January 31, 1983 to Move Offices (R.59, Findings of Fact 
No.4). Nothing in the contract required Plaintiff/Appellant to work at any 
particular location much less in a particular office. The Court did not find 
that it did. In fact the finding in question faults Plaintiff /Appellant for 
renting space already rented by Defendant/Respondent, an issue which is 
collateral to the contract in question. 
Home Parent/Foster Parent Manual Submitted January 22, 1983 (R.59 
Finding No. 5.) Here again the Trial Court makes no finding that the manual 
in question failed to meet contract specifications. In fact, the contract did 
not require Plaintiff/Appellant to produce any such manual although the 
assignment was a proper one and within the general scope of the work required 
by the contract (R. 4 and 5.) This finding merely established the fact that 
Plaintiff/Appellant could receive at most Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250) 
under the contract and he had not earned the balance of the One Thousand Five 
Hundred Dollars ($1,500) advance he had received at the time of the 
assignment. Plaintiff/Appellant has never claimed that he had earned the One 
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,250) difference, but only that he was 
guaranteed sufficient work to earn the contract total of Twenty-four Thousand 
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Dollars ($24,000). The fact that he elected not to "reinvent the wheel," but 
to use another's work product that he had compiled caused no injury to 
Defendant/Respondent, but actually gave it the means of providing that much 
more social services for the youth for whom the state had contracted. 
(Ex. P-10.) 
Appellant's Meeting With Steve Trotter ( R.60, Finding No. 6.) 
Plaintiff/Appellant took this young man to breakfast after learning he was not 
going to school and was unsupervised. He did that after he was unable to 
contact the boy's parents and the social worker assigned to that boy. His 
testimony that he had permission of Defendant/Respondent's director to contact 
the youth under the agency's program was uncontradicted. After being told no 
contact should be made without express parental or social worker permission, 
he did not do so but was frustrated by not having been given any assignments 
by the social worker in question. No claim is made that this contact with 
this boy had any actual or even potentially detrimental consequences. 
Whether taken individually or in their entirety, these four 
incidents certainly did not involve the main purpose of the contract, to wit 
delivery of social services to troubled youth. In fact, Plaintiff /Appellant's 
eagerness to perform the work which constituted to reason for the contract 
seems to have been a source of friction between the parties. (See Exhibits 
"P 14-P 26 • ") 
Plaintiff/Appellant submits that the foregoing shows that 
circumstances (a) as applied to the facts of this case favors 
Plaintiff/Appellant. 
As for circumstance (b), it seems clear that any breach by 
Plaintiff /Appellant would be adequately compensated in damages and could 
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simply be witheld from the Twenty-two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($22,500) 
yet due in his 
Circumstance (c) is the single most critical factor in this 
particular case as the hardship upon Plaintiff /Appellant of losing Twenty-two 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($22,500) is most disproportionate to the minor 
breaches and any injury caused Defendant/Respondent by them. 
As for circumstance (d), there is no dispute that Plaintiff/ 
Appellant was at all times ready, willing and able to perform the work 
assigned to him and was pressing Defendant/Respondent for assignments. (Ex. 
P-19, P-23, P-26.) 
As for circumstance (e), the behavior of Plaintiff /Appellant should 
be classified as innocent as to the phone call to Russ Van Vleet, in compiling 
the parenting manual and in taking Steve Trotter to breakfast. His refusal to 
move his office was willful, but within his rights as the contract was one of 
an independent contractor not one of employment. In short, he did act in good 
faith and met the standards of fair dealing. 
Circumstance ( f), would favor relief on appeal as Defendant/ 
Respondent has control of Plaintiff/Appellant's performance in that payment 
under the contact is made as services are rendered. 
The most applicable comment from case precedent which Plaintiff/ 
Appellant has found is his from M & W Development Inc. vs. El Paso Water Co. 
634 P2d 166 (Kansas app., 1981). It reads as follows: 
The record contains substantial competent evidence to 
support the trial judge's finding that El Paso breached 
the contract by not issuing notes to M & W. We cannot 
say, however, that "material breach" justifying 
rescission of the contract has occurred, as was concluded 
by the trial judge. What justifies rescission of a 
contract was considered in In re Estate of Johnson, 202 
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Kan. 684, 691 92, 452 P.2d 286 (1969), wherein the 
Supreme Court commented: 
"The right to rescind a contract is extreme and 
does not necessarily arise from every breach. 
To warrant rescission, the breach must be mater-
ial and the failure to perform so substantial 
as to defeat the object of the parties in 
making the agreement. A breach which goes to 
only a part of the consideration, which is 
incidental and subordinate to the main purpose 
of a contract, does not warrant a rescission. 
(Baron vs. Lyman, 136 Kan. 842, 18 P .2d 137; 17 
Am.Jur.2d, Contracts Section 504; 17A C.J.S., 
Contracts Section 422 ( 1 ); Corbin on Contracts 
Section 1104.)" (Emphasis supplied.) 
COICLUSIOll 
This case should be remanded to the lower Court to enter judgment in 
favor of Plaintiff /Appellant in against Defendant/Respondent for the contract 
balance less income received by Plaintiff/Appellant for like services rendered 
other or which should have been rendered to others in mitigation of damages 
during the contract period. 
Respectfully submitted this {pf{ day of September, 1983. 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney for Plaintiff /Appellant 
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